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argument, which is very obvious, has taken
possession of the minds of all men from their
earliest age. But there are other arguments,
stronger and more numerous, but not so
obvious to everyone, which strongly urge the
opposite. One is that it is more probable that
worms and flies and caterpillars move mecha
nically than that they all have immortal souls. 2

Philosophically, Descartes' counter to the argument
from analogy is not plausible for many reasons,3
including the fact that it is wedded to a version of mind
body dualism fraught with well-known difficulties.
Scientifically, the argument from analogy has grown
even stronger since Descartes' time. It has been
buttressed by centuries of observation, much of it done
at great cost to nonhuman animals, that reveal complex,
detailed similarities between human and nonhuman
vertebrate nervous systems. We know that many
nonhuman animals have the same pain mechanisms we
do, and their behaviors are consistent with this fact.
Even some invertebrates appear to have some parts of
this mechanism. 4 Moreover, as Bernard RollinS and
James Rachels6 have argued, we fly in the face of the
superbly confirmed theory of evolution if we assume
that consciousness is a uniquely human trait. Logic,
science, and common sense all point to the existence of
nonhuman animal suffering.

Generally, people who have had the opportunity
to observe nonhuman animals, especially vertebrates,
for any length of time take for granted that these beings
are conscious and capable of suffering. If we are
pressed to give a rational defense of this belief, we
can have no better start than the inductive argument
from analogy to other minds from one's own case.
Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me
and who respond in complex, creative ways to stimuli
that also elicit my responses are probably conscious
just as I am. This is an extraordinarily strong inductive
argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case
analogical reasoning, licensing one to infer that
another, be the other human or nonhuman, is not
merely a cleverly contrived machine.! Those who are
skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not
persuaded by the argument, but they also cannot be
persuaded about the existence of their own bodies, let
alone anyone else's. Short of solipsism, one seems not
to be irrational in putting one's confidence in the
argument from analogy.

PHILOSOPHY

Ren6 Descartes had doubts about the exten
sion of this argument to nonhumans: This
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proclaim that anesthesia in operations on animals is
merely a method of "chemical restraint," having nothing
whatever to do with pain relief. 14
As mentioned before, the philosophical movement
of logical positivism has also had its influence on
science: any discussion of conscious states in
nonbumans (or, for that matter, humans) was ruled out
as meaningless because such claims cannot be tested
by observations. All claims about values fell by the
wayside as well, reducing any ethical dilemmas a
researcher might have to emotional, rationally
irresolvable matters of taste. This view is no longer
taken seriously by philosophers-for one thing, logical
positivism cannot pass its own criterion of meaning
fulness-but its influence can still be seen in
psychology, biology, and physics. In short, philo
sophical views do matter in the conduct of science,
particularly when these views have implications many
scientists find attractive. (Scientists are hardly unique
in this regard, to be sure.)
Some will find the articles by Carruthers and
Harrison, with their conclusion that animal suffering
is for the most part a myth, quite attractive. IS These
articles come at a time when many research scientists
are mounting a counterattack on those who charge that
their work with nonhumans is unethical. Both articles
appeared in journals of philosophy with very high
reputations (indeed, Carruthers' piece was published
by the journal with the top reputation in analytic
philosophy in the world), and their influence is already
spreading. Harrison's article has recently been
excerpted in a popular anthology on nonhuman animal
research. 16 Defenders of factory farming, commercial
hunting and trapping, and the use of nonhuman
animals in product testing will likely also see these
essays as contributions to their counterattacks. Both
philosophers explicitly draw the obvious ethical
consequences of their conclusions, Harrison only
briefly-"Such causes as animal liberation may have
to be rethought"17~and Carruthers at greater length.
He expresses indignation at the charge that factory
farming involves animal cruelty, terming this attack
"morally objectionable" and going so far as to declare
that we have a "moral imperative" to cease feeling
sympathy for nonhuman animals. 18
Thus, it is important to respond to such philo
sophical argumentation. It is especially important that
the response be rationally defensible. Otherwise, one
is apt to be dismissed as a purely emotional

Nevertheless, as Rollin (a professor of physiology
and biophysics as well as a professor of philosophy)
has painstakingly documented, some scientists even to
this day persist in denying that animals can experience
pain, relying implicitly on the philosophically long
discredited views of logical positivism and behaviorism.
He is cautiously optimistic about the fact that it is
becoming scientifically respectable once more to
attribute conscious states to nonhumans in the social
and natural sciences. 7 Ironically, if two current
philosophers, Peter Harrison 8 and Peter Carruthers,9
writing independently, have their way, scientists might
as well return to the practice of nailing research animals
to boards for vivisection without benefit of anesthesia.
Descartes' views are with us again, albeit in con
temporary dress.
Now, quite a few of us regard it as screamingly
obvious that nonhuman animals can suffer. Is it not a
waste of time to critique such articles? Unfortunately,
it is not. Philosophers have been enormously influential
in shaping attitudes toward nonhuman animals.
Descartes, a scientific experimentalist whose own
interest in the issue of nonhuman animal treatment was
not purely philosophical, had a profound effect on the
practice of vivisection. Long before anesthesia became
available, experimenters taking apart yelping animals
in laboratories laughed at the sounds, comparing them
to clocks striking the hour. lO (Rachels notes that some
researchers must have found all the noise distracting,
however, rmding it prudent to sever the animals' vocal
cords. Some clocks do need to be muffled. II) Later, two
hundred years after Descartes' death, Claude Bernard,
a pioneer in experimental physiology, routinely
vivisected complex animals, speaking of them in
these terms:
It is necessary, so to speak, to take an organism
to pieces in successive stages, in the same way
that one dismantles a machine, in order to
recognize and to study its working parts,12
Although anesthesia was in practice then, Bernard
never used it, any more than he would have tried to use
it on a timepiece. (His wife and daughters found
themselves unable to share his views; they originated
the first European anti-vivisection society after coming
home one day to discover that Bernard had vivisected
the family dog. 13) Even now, as Rollin reports, the
occasional veterinarian (of all people) will publicly
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2. We know humans experience such pains (or that
we do, atany rate!); we survive them because we
are insulated by our cultures from the effects of
natural selection.

anthropomorphic fantasizer when one objects to the
rubbing of noxious substances into immobilized
rabbits' eyes. I will argue that reason, not just emotion,
severely undermines the denial of nonhuman animal
suffering. Most of my time will be spent on Harrison's
piece. Carruthers' article has already been ably
attacked by philosopher Edward Johnson,19 so I will
confine myself to additional important problems with
it. In the end, it should be clear that these defenses of
the animal-as-machine model are no more successful
than the one Rene Descartes proposed in the mid
seventeenth century.

3. Other, lesser pains would have no evolutionary
value to nonhuman animals either, because:
a. Nonhuman animals can make no choices.
Survival-enhancing behavior can be determined
without the "superfluous" experience of pain,
as studies of reflex actions show.
b. The argument from analogy that leads us to
believe otherwise is bad because

Harrison's Attack on Nonhuman Animal Suffering

Peter Harrison tries to turn the supporting evidence
for the argument from analogy on its head. He argues
that evolutionary theory actually undercuts the
assumption that nonhumans can experience pain. He
denies the relevance of the copiously documented
similarities between human and nonhuman animals.
Overall, he claims to be defending Descartes'
conclusion without the encumbrance of Descartes'
metaphysics. His purpose is explicitly theological. He
believes that the existence of human suffering can be
reconciled with the existence of God because (a)
suffering caused to humans by humans is the price of
free will and (b) suffering due to natural causes builds
human character. On the other hand, he believes that
nonhuman animal suffering cannot be explained away
in these terms,20 Thus, he quite literally explains it away
in other terms, i.e., by denying that there is any such
phenomenon. (As we shall see, he also must deny the
existence of suffering in very young children-a
decided theological bonus). The argument he gives to
convince us is, he warns us, not a "strict" argument
against the existence of nonhuman animal pain, due to
the fact that pain is essentially private,21 but he does
claim to make a plausible case for his contention. Let
us now tum to his argument.

(1) so-called ''pain behavior" in nonhumans

is no more than an adaptive response, as is
shown by the different behaviors of, e.g, a
wildebeest and a chimp in circumstances
we would fmd painful.
(2) The very minimal difference in physiology

between humans and nonhuman animals
has no bearing on pain: "It has long been

recognized" that pain is an overwhelmingly
psychological phenomenon because:
(a) Aristotle, Spinoza, and Ryle hold that
pain is not really a sensation.
(b) Psychological factors can playa major

role in pain perception.
c. Nonhuman animals could "learn" from
experiences we would find painful, thus
enhancing their survival chances, without
having any conscious experiences at all, as is
shown by studies of habituation in protozoa.
4. Humans experience lesser pains, as we know,
not to ensure our survival (see 2), but to "free us
from instinct" when we choose to endure or not
endure pain. All pain is a complex phenomenon
experienceable only by highly developed
"conscious egos." Nonhuman animals lack the
complexity required for consciousness.

A. Why nonhuman animal pain allegedly does not exist
Harrison's argument can be summarized as follows:
-Ie

l

1. Many kinds of pain could have no evolutionary
value for nonhuman animals; quite the contrary.
This includes frustration, anxiety, grief, and severe
debilitating pain.
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with one's offspring; chronic pain may be destructive,
but the mechanism responsible for it could be very
constructive indeed in other circumstances.26 Moreover,
Harrison provides no independent grounds for thinking
that nonhumans cannot experience grief, anxiety,
frustration, or chronic pain. To Harrison, the behavior
of a cat or dog who ceases to eat when a companion
human or nonhuman dies must be inexplicable, as would
be the behavior ofclosely confIned nonhumans in zoos,
on farms, and in research laboratories. Even the most
unsentimental nonhuman animal scientists are
beginning to speak openly about such states in their
subjects. 27 "Porcine Stress Syndrome" (PSS) and
"mourning behavior" in tightly restrained sows are
conditions identilled and named by the pork industry
itself. Psychologists whose research involves the
induction of grief, anxiety, anguish and psychosis in
nonhumans would also disagree with Harrison.
Harrison also gives us no good reason to believe
that humans differ fundamentally from nonhumans in
their experiences of "harmful" pains. No evidence
whatever is given to support his contention that humans
alone have escaped the strictures of natural selection.
Did primitive humans hundreds of thousands of years
ago have no such experiences? Or did they somehow
"thwart" natural selection as modem humans allegedly
have? Presently, one might say that in some societies
medical care allows us to save those who would
otherwise die before being able to reproduce, but this
has only been so for a short while in human history,
and not universally so even then. It is also simply false
to say that debilitating pain, depression, anxiety, etc.,
do not threaten our survival. Stress-related severe
illnesses, cancer included, not to mention suicide,
indicate otherwise. Harrison even quotes, to support
his own view, a researcher's claim that chronic human
pain interferes with human survival. 28 By his own
argument above, employed against the possibility of
such experiences in nonhumans, humans should also
not be capable of them. If he were to reply that the
human species as a whole is able to continue despite
these individual deaths because most of us do not
succumb to these very negative pains or are able to
replace our deaths with the lives of offspring, why could
this not also be true of nonhumans? Contrary to
Harrison, evolutionary biologists see continuity rather
than discontinuity between nonhumans and humans.
Allan C. Wilson argues that "the brain of mammals and
birds" can itself drive evolution by allowing members

The rationales for Harrison's major contentions will
be discussed, followed by responses to those rationales.

The contention that evolutionary theory rules out
severe, debilitating pain and "mental" pain such as
anxiety, grief, frustration, etc., in nonhumans
Harrison's fIrst two premises rely on this contention.
He makes this assertion on the simple ground that such
pains have no survival value. In fact, pains of this kind
often interfere with one's survival. Hence, "the canons
of evolutionary dogma" do not permit the attribution
of such experiences to nonhuman animals. Humans, on
the other hand, do have such experiences, as one knows
from one's own case. We have them despite their
unhelpful consequences because we have "thwarted
natural selection:" human culture in general insulates
us from the ravages of nature, keeping such painful
experiences from threatening human existence.22 Thus,
evolutionary theory is allegedly compatible with the
existence of these experiences in humans but incom
patible with their existence in nonhumans.
This contention is inadequately supported for a
number of reasons. First of all, Harrison simply.
misunderstands evolutionary theory. No evolutionary
biologist would claim that every trait possessed by a
typical member of a species has to have survival value.
As Stephen Jay Gould puts it, "[the] imperfection of
nature reveals evolution."23 Very colloquially speaking,
a large part of inheritance is a crap shoot. Variation is
due to mutations, which are copying errors in the genetic
code, and most of these mutations are neither
enormously helpful nor destructive. Individuals can
survive and pass on their traits even if some of those
traits are not particularly advantageous and might at
times even interfere with survival. As Niles Eldridge
says, "[that] some of these biological mistakes may
ultimately prove to be benefIcial is all evolutionists have
ever claimed."24 It is individuals with their collection
of more or less benefIcial, neutral, and harmful traits
who are subject to natural selection, not the individual
traits themselves. 25 Harrison also does not consider the
possibility that a trait may be harmful in some
circumstances and benefIcial in others (intelligence is
one trait that comes to mind in this connection) or that
it may be harmful in the short run but useful in the long
run. For example, frustration might lead one to make
benefIcial changes in one's circumstances; grief is the
consequence of caring, a trait that strengthens bonds
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Harrison seems to be assuming that conscious
experiences can have no role in nonhuman animal
behavior. Pain would be unnecessary because, allegedly,

of a species to begin interacting with a habitat in new
ways, ways that themselves expose members of the
species to new selection procedures, leading to the
perpetuation of individuals with different traits. 29
Wilson is hardly alone in attributing ingenuity,
creativity, and intelligence to nonhumans. 3o Why
shouldn't "negative" traits also be shared by humans
and nonhumans?
In short, Harrison has not shown that evolutionary
theory supports his view that only humans could
experience seriously harmful pains (premises 1 and 2).
Instead, there is good reason to believe otherwise.

the nonhuman animal simply responds, puppet-like, to
the external forces acting upon her. 32 Pain in these
circumstances would not be survival-enhancing. Yet,
this is the very thesis that Harrison is trying to persuade
us to accept: the thesis that animals are machines. He
can hardly convince us of this thesis by appealing to it
in his premises! This leads to the second and related
major problem with Harrison's line of argumentation
here. He simply assumes without argument that only
humans can make choices. Since considerable,
respectable evidence to the contrary has been amassed
by ethologists,33 Harrison should at least address that
body of information. He makes no such attempt.
Instead, Harrison now turns to the argument from
analogy, rightly recognizing that it seems to provide
powerful support for the contention that animals can
experience at least simple pains. He rejects it for two
reasons. First of all (premise 3b-l), he judges it to be
scientifically unsupported, fanciful thinking:

The contention that"lesser" pains would also have
no evolutionary value for nonhumans
Having rejected the view that nonhumans are
capable of complex, counter-productive sorts of pain
experiences, Harrison goes on to consider the claim that
the ability to experience simple, useful pains would
confer an adaptive advantage on nonhuman animals.
He rejects this claim as well (premise 3 above),
primarily on the grounds that the point of such a
mechanism would be to allow the animal to make
survival-enhancing choices. Since, in Harrison's view,
no nonhuman is capable of making a choice, such a
mechanism would be gratuitous at best:

we tend to presume that certain animal
behaviors are expressions of pain-an internal
state-whereas they should properly be
construed as adaptive behaviors which
probably have some social significance. 34

If no 'choice' is involved in animal behavior,

why should they suffer pain-to compel them
to behave in certain ways? No, for surely their
behavior is determined in a way that does not
require the superfluous promptings of pain. 31

Harrison asks us to consider a wildebeest being killed
by wild dogs and a chimpanzee with a thorn in his foot.
The chimpanzee screams pitiously, "as if in pain," but
the wildebeest makes no outcry.35 The chimpanzee
behaves as we expect, the wildebeest does not, but each
is responding in a generally "adaptive" way: it is to
chimpanzees' advantage in thorny situations to get aid;
it is not to wildebeests' advantage to expose the rest of
the herd to predators. Neither, Harrison assumes, is
really experiencing pain; they are simply doing
evolution's bidding.
This is not a convincing attack on the argument from
analogy. Harrison's claim that nonhuman animal
behaviors are adaptive rather than expressions of pain
is a clear instance of the fallacy of false dilemma.
Behaviors can be expressions ofpain and have adaptive
significance as well. Harrison thinks not, presumably
because he believes that his wildebeest-chimpanzee
example shows (a) the wildebeest experiences no pain
and (b) there is no reason to think that chimpanzees

This stage of Harrison's argument (premise 3a) is
faulty for at least two reasons. First, he relies on the
undefended assumption that the capacity to choose is
incompatible with the deterministic thesis that all
behavior is caused by events which are in tum caused,
etc. The classic problem faced by such a view is how to
construe an uncaused choice in a meaningful way, not
merely as an inexplicable, random event. If we reject
the view that choice and causation are incompatible (Le.,
the view that all causation must be compulsion), it
makes perfectly good sense to interpret pain as part of
the causal sequence leading to a wolf cub's refusal to
play with the next porcupine in her path. Why should
the experience of pain be "superfluous" in this series
of events? I can fathom but one reason for such a claim:

Winter 1993

31

Between the Species

Arg!l-ing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revivale

does have an adaptive advantage; this is compatible with
the suffering of the animal. There is yet another
alternative. Humans have reported that sometimes, at
times of great physical trauma, physical damage that
one would expect to cause excruciating pain is somehow
suspended. Later, if one survives the trauma, the pain
comes roaring in. This phenomenon is known as "stress
induced analgesia."39 A response of this kind would be
advantageous, not only to the individual who is
momentarily spared agony, who may then be able to
concentrate on fighting for life or at least not die
instantly of shock, but to the species as a whole. Perhaps
the wildebeest, and others in similar circumstances, is
being naturally anesthetized. While we can hope that
this is so, such a possibility must remain speculative at
this point. 4o Note, however, that this interpretation of
the wildebeest's behavior is fully compatible with the
argument from analogy: it grows out of human reports,
is in line with our similar physiologies, and actually
contradicts Harrison's claim that only humans are
capable of pain perception (and hence of being
anesthetized). Harrison has not shown his machine
model of nonhuman animal behavior to be more
plausible than either the suffering or the stress-induced
analgesia hypotheses.
At this point, Harrison launches his second attack
on the argument from analogy (premise 3b-2). Since
he cannot and does not deny that there is between
humans and many nonhumans an overwhelming
physiological similarity in respects relevant to pain
perception, he chooses to dismiss the importance of this
similarity instead. He cites Aristotle, Spinoza, Ryle, and
some twentieth-century psychological research to
buttress his view that "pain is associated with 'higher'
faculties, the study of which is more properly
psychological than physiological.,,41 He then leaps to
the conclusion that pain is primarily a psychological
phenomenon, joins it to the conclusion that psycho
logical factors do not operate in nonhumans, and asserts
that "[a]ll human experiences of pain, I have argued,
are functions of our distinctive consciousness, and thus
cannot be shared by our furry friends."42 Harrison
claims to be eschewing Cartesian dualism in drawing
this overall conclusion: he holds that we, unlike him,
commonly assume that nonhumans experience pain
because we associate pain with the body and more
complex pains such as frustration, anxiety, etc., with
the mind: thus the common view is (supposedly) that
nonhumans are capable of the former but not the latter.

differ from wildebeests in this regard. He considers the
possibility that both might be experiencing pain, but
turns it into a "straw possibility" by caricaturing that
position. He describes the belief that the chimpanzee is
being an oversensitive coward whereas the wildebeest
is stoically enduring agony as "crudely anthro
pomorphic."36 This may be so, but it does not show the
belief that the two are expressing their pain differently
to be anthropomorphic. We must indeed guard against
using the argument from analogy in a simplistic way,
but it is Harrison who is guilty of doing this here, not
those who believe that nonhumans can experience pain.
In fact, Rollin has argued that those who deny that
nonhumans could be experiencing pain if they do not
behave exactly as we do are the ones guilty of
anthropomorphism. 37

The view that vertebrate nonhuman aninials can
experience pain is consonant with the neurophysio
logical similarity of human and nonhuman species-a
similarity Harrison fully concedes38 -and evolutionary
theory. Humans generally yell, just as our 98.4%
genetically similar chimpanzee cousins do, when we
get large thorns in our appendages. We also happen to
be experiencing pain when we do this; is it anthro
pomorphic to believe that chimpanzees do too? As for
the wildebeest, who possesses the same nervous system
that is linked to pain perception in our case, behavior
that does not endanger the rest of the herd obviously
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incident. In our own case, pain seems to be higbly
instructive, as humans wbo lack the pain mechanism
discover (provided they live long enougb to arrive at
that realization). Nonbumans do not behave as if they
could never experience pain; they behave as if they learn
from it. As Harrison himself admits, nonbumans are
used in pain research and can be, as be puts it,
"conditioned by 'pain.' "46
The best that Harrison can do in trying to make sense
of the fact that nonhumans can learn from nonexistent
pain is to cite the example of protozoan "learning." He
cites a study in which these one-celled beings exbibited
habituation to a repeated stimulus. 47 Clearly, he thinks,
this shows that learning ("learning"?) does not require
consciousness. Although he denies that he is claiming
that all learning in nonhumans is of this sort, this must
be·what he believes, given his macbine model. Yet this
sort of response by a one-celled organism bears no
relation to a wolf's refusal to tangle with her second
porcupine, a dog's cowering away from a human wbo
has beaten him but once before, or a goat's avoidance
ofan electrified fence that once gave ber a shock. These
are not acts of blind habituation. Harrison gives us no
way to fathom these behaviors.
Harrison, therefore, has not sbown that the capacity
to experience pain would have no evolutionary
advantage for nonbumans. What of the fact that humans,
who have also evolved, do experience pain? Harrison
turns to this question in bis premise 4.

This won't do. Despite his disclaimer, Harrison is
the one who appears to cling to Cartesian dualism,
construing all pain as part of the mind rather than the
body. He provides no evidence sufficient to establish
this sweeping conclusion (eminent as Aristotle,
Spinoza, and Ryle were, they have been known to be
wrong, and the psychological studies he cites from
the 1950s are either thoroughly outdated by current
research43 or irrelevant to the dismissal of physiology
in favor of psychology). No one these days denies that
beliefs and emotions can affect pain perception: it does
not follow from this that pain is a psychological rather
than a physiological phenomenon. Moreover, Harrison
does not address the evidence that nonhumans
apparently can also be affected by psychological
factors when they are in situations we would regard
as painfill in our own cases (e.g., as is the case for
humans, companion nonhuman animals show less
"distress" when ill if they are treated kindly rather than
coldly and clinically).44 His argumentation on this head
is quite simply question-begging: pain is primarily
psychological (an unsupported contention); nonhuman
animals have no psyches to speak of (also unsupported);
thus nonhuman animals experience no pain. They are
machines because they are machines.
Finally, in his attempt to show tfuit a pain mechanism
would provide no evolutionary advantage to non
humans, Harrison tries to show that they could "learn"
from experiences that would cause pain to us without
being conscious at all (premise 3c). When we touch a
very hot surface, we instantly, reflexively, withdraw;
the experience of pain comes after the withdrawal,so
the experience has not caused us to act. Harrison
believes this sbows conscious awareness of pain to be
unnecessary for the production of survival-enhancing
behavior. 45 Tbus, he holds, evolutionary processes
would not favor the emergence of a capacity for pain in
nonbumans. (He recognizes that this poses a puzzle for
the existence of hUflUln pain. His way of trying to resolve
that puzzle will be discussed below.)
Once again, this line of argument fails to support
Harrison's conclusion. Withdrawing from a flame is
indeed a reflex action rather than a consciously
motivated response to pain, but avoiding the flame the
next time is another matter. Nonhumans are at least as
likely as humans to avoid situations of this kind after
their initial occurrence. This can hardly be construed
as reflex action, and it is difficult to see bow it would
occur if a painful experience bad no part in the prior
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The explanation ofhUflUln pain
"Why do we feel pain if animals do not?," asks
Harrison. 48 He makes no attempt to relate the capacity
for pain to an evolutionary advantage for humans,
despite his admission that humans who lack the capacity
are not long for this world. 49 Of course, it would be
difficult for him to· argue that the experience gives
humans an adaptive advantage when be believes be bas
shown that it provides no such advantage to nonhumans.
Moreover, bis contention that bumans are not subject
to natural selection pressures (premise 2) would be in
direct contradiction io such an attempted explanation.
The explanation be does provide is rather curious. He
bolds that humans, unlike nonbumans, are capable of
freedom of choice, and pain allegedly enables us to act
deliberately rather than instinctively. Harrison
believes that tbe capacity for pain is a necessary
condition for freedom of the will:
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may take it for granted that we reserve praiseworthy
terminology for ourselves, but it is far from clear that
this is justified. 51
Why, indeed, should humans be able deliberately
to flout their own well-being and nonhumans be
incapable of doing such a thing? What naturalistic
explanation could account for such an alleged
difference? Certainly, deliberate action requires some
intelligence, but as Harrison concedes in a footnote,52
nonhumans can display high degrees of intelligence,
too. Human children and some brain-damaged humans
can also act in self-sacrificial ways, and their
intellectual development may not differ significantly
from the corresponding capacities of some non
humans. I strongly suspect that Harrison has no
naturalistic explanation of the difference he (and many
others) believes to obtain between human and
nonhuman behaviors. The language in his remark that
"[f1ree will is at the high cost of suffering, but it is a
suffering which is rightly restricted to the human
realm" is redolent of a theological explanation.'
Harrison, remember, is grappling with and trying to
defeat the argument from evil against the existence of
God. As he sees it, human suffering must be good for
us, make us better persons; since he seems to take for
granted that nonhumans are not capable of such
betterment, he finds it necessary to deny that they
suffer at all. Those without Harrison's theological
presuppositions will be left unconvinced by such
argumentation. 53
Finally, it is not difficult to conceive of a being who
could make choices-including morally praiseworthy
choices-without ever experiencing pain; God would
be an outstanding case in point. Nor need we reach so
high or so controversially for an example: surely
Harrison would not claim that humans who lack the
capacity for pain are unable to make choices.
Thus Harrison has failed on all counts in his attempt
to show that the experience of pain is a necessary
condition for an allegedly unique human ability to make
choices. Premise 4 has failed just as resoundingly as
premises 1-3. Harrison's overall argument consists of a
series of inadequately supported statements, hasty
generalizations, and question-begging assumptions. The
assumptions that nonhumans cannot make choices,
consciously learn, or have even undeveloped psyches,
already portray them as machines. Humans, by contrast,
are portrayed as free, uniquely insulated from natural
selection, potentially magnificently brave, virtuous

What is distinctive about the human race is
our ability to choose...We are free, in painful
situations, to damage our bodies if we believe
that there is a higher priority ...Pain frees us
from the compulsion of acting instinctively;
it issues harsh warnings, but they are
warnings which may be ignored. It is our
capacity for pain which has given rise to those
uniquely human attributes of courage,
resignation, self-control, perseverance,
endurance, and their opposites, and it is
significant that we reserve these terms for
ourselves...Free will is at the high cost of
suffering, but it is a suffering which is rightly
restricted to the human realm. 50
This is a very puzzling argument. First of all, pain
seems to be more a hindrance than a help to choice
making as Harrison conceives it. Wouldn't it be a great
deal easier to defy "instinct" if we were not subject to
pain? We normally act to avoid being burned, stabbed,
kicked, etc., just as many nonhumans do. (In the world
as it has developed this helps us one and all to survive,
but this line of argument is not open to Harrison, as
we saw above.) Now, I do not claim that such
avoidance behavior is unfree (unlike Harrison, I do
not think that freedom and causation are incompatible),
but Harrison is reaching for a concept of freedom that
is unique to human behavior. He has not shown us
how pain "frees us [in his sense] from the compulsion
of instinct."
Harrison might reply that only humans can act
despite pain; Le., we are uniquely capable of courage,
endurance, perseverance, etc. This is freedom in the
highest sense, one might hold, the putting of other
considerations over our own well-being. Without pain,
Harrison could say, we have no barometer of well-being,
and terms like"courageous" become empty (as do terms
like "cowardly"). Nonhumans, however, sometimes
behave as if they, too, defy pain. When we behave in
these ways, we garner moral credit for ourselves; when
they do, Harrison regards them as machines. He is not
the only one to engage in double-standard thinking here:
a human mother who attacks an armed criminal
threatening her children, risking injury and death, is
"heroic" and "courageous;" a harp seal mother who
charges a seal hunter, finally throwing herself across
her pup, taking the skull-shattering bashing intended
for her offspring, is "just acting instinctively!" Harrison
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that nonhumans have insufficient continuity of
consciousness to remember pain. Once again, the
double standard clicks into place: when I avoid the
bully Who beat me senseless yesterday, I am
remembering my. painful experience and acting
appropriately; when Beauregard Beagle cowers away
from the human who kicked him repeatedly yesterday,
heis gripped by unconscious instinct!60 Second, even
if he were correct in claiming that nonhumans and
some humans cannot remember pain, this could hardly
render insignificant the pain that he admits takes place.
I could beat you mercilessly, then give you a drug that
would remove all your memories of the beating.
Plainly, your suffering would still be immense, and I
would be wronging you by inflicting it. As Rollin
points out in discussing a similar view, if it were really
true that nonhumans could remember no past pain,
during a time of suffering they would be incapable of
remembering pain's absence; thus they would be
trapped in an agonizing, unending present. 61 How
could one be justified in focusing on the beings they
willbecome in the future, when as Harrison has it they
will have forgotten, rather than on the beings who are
suffering right now? Surely, one owes more to
someone who is suffering than to someone who is
oblivious to suffering, especially if we are ourselves
inflicting the pain!
. It is now necessary to speak for human infants,
who have been tarred with the same brush applied to
nonhumans. The degree to which infants have
continuity of consciousness is debatable: their nervous
systems are less well developed than the nervous
sy&tems of adult mammals. Still, the parts of the
nervous system linked to pain perception are all
functional. All the neurophysiological equipment
necessary for pain perception in humans (and for
vertebrates in general) is present in those humans well
before birth, at 25 to 26 weeks after conception. (This
also holds for many nonhumans during the last
trimester.)62 Although Harrison asserts that "we regard
neonatal pain as less significant than pain which is
experienced later in life,"63 we have excellent reason
to believe that this pain can be very significant indeed.
Fo~ many years, in fact, doctors assumed that infants
fel~ little or no pain, or at least no serious pain, even
during major surgery, which was routinely performed
without anesthesia or (more recently) with only light
anesthesia. 64 Neurologists no longer believe this to be
the case. Carefully controlled studies have shown that

beings. Seldom since the days of Descartes has the deck
been stacked so high against nonhumans.
Harrison seems to realize that his argument is
unconvincing. The last part of his article now takes a.
stunning turn: he appears to concede that rwnhumans

can experience pain, but denies that this pain co~ld be
significant.
B. Why nonhuman pain is allegedly insignificant
Harrison begins by providing us with a series of
thought experiments to help us imagine what it would
be like to act as if one is in pain in response to stimuli
that we find painful and "yet not feel pain."54 However,
the.examples he goes on to sketch are really meant to
support the conclusion that any pain felt by a nonhuman
is experientially and morally insignificant. Long before
Harrison's day, Descartes also appeared to be running
both these lines simultaneously. Although he assured
us that nonhumans could only be automata, he also
claimed that they were capable of sensation. 55
Occasionally, an ambiguity hides the contradiction (e.g.,
Harrison's assertion that "animals do not experience
pain as we dO,"56) but a contradiction it nevertheless is.
Harrison asks us to imagine three cases: a man who
has violent nightmares that he never remembers, ~ drug
that immobilizes one without anesthetic and makes one
forget any pain that occurred under its influence, and
our inability to remember any pain suffered as infants.
The common thread in these cases is the inability to
recall pain. Surely, Harrison presses, such experiences
must be insignificant. Only experiences that we can sort
in with our other experiences can be "owned" by US. 57
Nonhumans, Harrison assumes without argument as he
has throughout his discussion, are like infants: they
"have no self," are mere bundles of discrete sensations,
are incapable of doing any such sorting, ofremembering
that they have been in pain. 58 He no longer claims that
pain has not occurred: "I am not implying here that
painful experiences which are forgotten were never
painful to start with."59 However, significant pain
requires "a continuity of consciousness" open only to
older humans (unless, of course, one is greatly mentally
impaired-a possibility conspicuously absent from his
entire discussion, although it poses well-known
problems for theodicy.)
Harrison is no better off going with this half of the
contradiction than he was in denying pain altogether
to nonhumans. First, Harrison does not begin to show
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Carruthers' Attack on Nonhuman Suffering

human neonates who are deeply anesthetized during
surgery have greatly reduced levels of hormones
associated with stress in their blood afterwards, cry
less in the days after the operation, and, most
importantly, have a much better chance of surviving
than traditionally treated infants. Even infants
undergoing a relatively minor operation like circum
cision show benefits from local anesthesia: they cry
much less during and after the procedure and have
lower levels of stress hormones than their unanes
thetized counterparts.65 In fact, it is now thought by
pain researchers that babies and very young children
may experience more pain than adults, because a
"damping" mechanism which helps to cut down on
the severity of pain experiences does not develop until
later. 66 Only those who believe that mind and body
are hermetically sealed compartments could think that
physiology and appropriate behavior (e.g., crying)
need have nothing to do with suffering. Being unable
to verbalize one's pain makes it more likely that one's
pain will be ignored or disavowed; this has been just
as true for humans as it has been for nonhumans.
Luckily, it does seem to be true that we are less able
to remember pain occurring early in life than pain .
occurring later; that does not make the initial
experience any less agonizing, or make the infliction
of such pain any more permissible.
Thus, Harrison has failed to show that nonhuman
(and human neonate) pain is insignificant, just as he
earlier failed to show that no such pain exists.
Whichever half of the contradiction one seizes, one is
not rationally persuaded. Harrison provides no support
whatever for his key claims about the distinction
between humans (only some of them!) and non
humans, viz., that only humans are not subject to the
strictures of natural selection, are free, and possess
continuity of consciousness. (How it is possible for
nonhumans to be intelligent, creative, and even learn
American Sign Language, as we have seen him admit
in a footnote but not in his text, without a highly
complex integrated consciousness is an impenetrable
mystery.) Harrison is also utterly unable to show that
this concatenation of allegedly unique qualities
restricts suffering to normal adult humans. Opponents
of the argument from evil will have to look elsewhere
for a dissolution of nonhuman suffering; so will
opponents of the ascription of moral status to
nonhumans. Let us now tum to another participant in
the Neo-Cartesian revival.
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Peter Carruthers never mentions the name of Rene
Descartes, or refers to mind body dualism, but he clearly
subscribes to Descartes' machine model of non
humans. 67 Like Descartes, he claims to show that
nonhumans or "brutes," as he prefers to call them
cannot suffer. Unlike Harrison, he never wavers from
this contention. Note, however, some potentially
confusing terminology. He does ascribe "pain
experiences" to nonhumans, but he denies that a
"feeling" component is logically linked to the concept
of experience. 68 For those of us who fmd the concept
of an experience without a feeling component to be self
contradictory, Carruthers suggests we recast his
conclusion in our own language: he is arguing for the
nonexistence of pain experiences (feelings of pain)
or, in fact, any experiences-in nonhumans. First, I will
summarize his argument, then I will tum to a brief
evaluation of it, mainly covering ground unplowed by
Johnson's recent fme critique of the same article. 69

Why nonhumans allegedly cannot suffer
l. Humans have two types of"experiences." conscious
and unconscious (e.g., thinking about dinner while
driving home and being unable to recall driving
when one arrives; daydreaming about the article
you are working on while, all unawares, washing
and stacking dishes as usual; as a "blindsighted"
person, being able to catch a ball while denying
that one sees anything); unconscious experiences
"do notfeellike anything."7o

2. The best analysis of the difference between our
conscious and unconscious experiences is based
on suggestions by Daniel Dennett: the former and
not the latter are "available to conscious thought,
" where conscious thought is itself "available to
be thought about in tum."7l

3. It is obvious that "brutes" cannot think about their
experiences in acts of thinking that can themselves
be scrutinized.72
4. Although one might think that the very nature of
pain is to demand our conscious awareness (in
normal circumstances), to stimulate our with
drawal, this cannot be true of nonhumans, as
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for the nonexistence of nonhuman pain. The initial case
made by Harrison would remain as unconvincing as
ever, however. Is Carruthers any more successful in
making his own case for the nonexistence of nonhuman
suffering? No, as I shall argue below.

argued above; the mechanism of avoidance could
be in place unaccompanied by any feeling of
pain.73
5.lfnonhumans, as has been argued, cannot suffer,
even though they act as if they do, they are due no
moral concern on our part (e.g., it is "morally
objectionable" to criticize factory farming, or
indeed to feel any sympathy for nonhumans).74

Carruthers' inability to account/or nonhuman
animal behavior
Carruthers gives us no account of how nonhuman
animals can behave as they do if all of their
"experiences" are unconscious (or, to put it in the more
natural way, if they have no experiences at all). Indeed,
the very examples he uses to illustrate the consciousl
unconscious distinction,drawn ofnecessity from human
experience, make no sense whatever in a context where
no conscious experience has ever occurred. His dramatic
example of "blindsightedness" (having no conscious
experience of seeing because of lesions in the visual
cortex, but being able to catch balls, identify objects,
etc.) involves people who once did have conscious
experiences of seeing. The same holds for the far more
common examples of driving without being aware that
you are, etc. Complex habitual actions can certainly
occur without our being aware of them, but we had to
be consciously aware of performing such actions in the
first place in order to learn to do them. You cannot be a
driver or a dishwasher without this initial attention.
Moreover, if we sometimes do not pay attention to these
actions any more, it is because we are aware of
something else that distracts us from tlie task at hand.
What would it be like to perform complex tasks, behave
appropriately in changing circumstances, etc., without
ever having any conscious experiences at all? Without
ever feeling anything?
Carruthers does not say so, but perhaps he would
respond as Harrison has in a different context,
representing nonhuman behavior as largely a matter
of reflex and instinct. One need not be conscious to
respond if one is "programmed." However, as
ethologists have shown, much nonhuman behavior is
far too complex, varied, and apparently creative to
represent as mere instinctual or reflex activity. I cannot
resist giving a personal example here. My husband
and I have two feline companions, Callisto and
Ganymede. Since kittenhood, the two have found the
nearest bed and crawled under the blanket when loud
thunder, firecrackers, or frightening strangers have
made themselves apparent. It is hard enough to

Carruthers and Harrison wrote their articles
independently and had them published in the same
year, preventing one from responding to the other.
They have much in common, despite their very
different approaches. Clearly, both Carruthers and
Harrison think that nonhumans' allegedly impoverished
mentalities block awareness of pain: they follow
Descartes by intellectualizing suffering. It is possible,
though, that Carruthers would attack the last part of
Harrison's article-the argument that nonhuman pain
is insignificant-as being based on the confusion of
conscious with unconscious states. Carruthers might say
that if (to put it in Harrison's language) there is no
continuity of identity, no self, no "owning of the pain,"
then the nonhuman is not aware of being in pain. Now,
putting it in Carruthers' terms. this would mean that
the nonhuman has no conscious experience of pain: on
his view, nothing hurts, even though the nonhuman
behaves as if something hurts. We persist in thinking
that suffering is taking place, he could say, because the
argument from analogy distracts us from the vital
distinction between conscious experience and machine
like behavior. This way of recasting the last part of
Harrison's attack on nonhuman suffering would at least
dispel the contradiction between that part and his case

Winter 1993

37

Between the Species

Arguing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival

the dishes comes to mind. If a dish breaks, the content
ofone's awareness shifts; if someone immobilizes your
tail while you are lusting after the unobtainable, you
try to yank it loose. All of this human and nonhuman
behavior makes excellent sense when we assume that
consciousness is not an item inexplicably reserved for
bipedal, peltless primates.
Carruthers has an especially difficult time
explaining how "pain-like" behavior in nonhumans is
to be understood. It is hard to fathom how a nonhuman
whose paw is stepped on can scream, race away, and
hide while feeling absolutely nothing. The only
explanation Carruthers gives of such behavior is an
attempted extension of the blindsightedness phenom
enon. He argues that it is in principle possible for a
being to act conscious when he or she is not. However,
with regard to pain, he admits that there are no known
human cases of having pain without feeling it, and he
himself points out that the pain mechanism-a
mechanism shared by nonhumans-cannot be
truncated in the way the visual cortex can in
blindsightedness. He even states that:

imagine them doing this while feeling nothing, but
consider the next development. Just recently, in these
same frightening circumstances, Ganymede began
spontaneously to run to the sliding hall closet door,
work it ajar with his paw, and climb into its dark
recesses. Neither cat had ever done this before, and
we certainly didn't encourage them to do so (our shoes
are always so hairy afterwards). At frrst, Callisto would
follow him in at those times. Now she opens the door
herself, using a different maneuver: at half her
brother's size, she cannot manage the task with one
paw, so she flings herself to the floor, lies on her side,
and uses both paws. Sometimes Ganymede runs up in
the midst of this project and shoves the door ajar before
she can finish; then they both scramble in. Neither of
them tries to open the closet under nonfrightening
circumstances. Callisto, at frrst a follower, soon began
to go in even more often than her brother: she, always
the more fearful (how else can one describe it?) of the
two, breaks into the closet whenever someone rings
the doorbell; he curiously (so it seems!) waits to greet
the visitor at the top of the stairs. All of this behavior
is explicable if one assumes that the cats are afraid,
are consciously trying to gain reassurance, believe that .
the closet is a safe place, and are bright enough to
learn how to force the closet door ajar. Moreover,
neither carbon-copies the behavior of the other. How
can we begin to understand what is going on if we
assume that they feel nothing at all?
The background assumption of nonhuman animal
consciousness fits plausibly with the hypothesis that
they have unconscious experiences as well. As I write
this paper, I am seldom aware of the placement of my
feet (except for now!); there seems to be too much to
be concerned about at any given time to open one's
awareness to everything one is sensing. Nonhuman
animal behavior is consistent with the same phenom
enon. A cat watching a bird perched just out of reach
will focus hard on the delectable item; she chatters and
swishes her tail back and forth rapidly. Is she
consciously aware of all this activity in her nether
region? We do not know, but she seems to have eyes
only for the "meal on wings." Now, gently putting your
unshod foot on the eat's tail results in behavior we would
call "confused" if it occurred in a human. She stops
chattering at the bird, looks around at you, tries to pull
away her tail, and may meow sharply at you. The intent,
wide-eyed look is gone. Carruthers' description of the
writer planning his paper while mechanically washing
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There is an obvious reason for [the lack of
evidence that humans can bave pain without
. feeling it], since part of the function of pain is
to intrude upon consciousness, in order that
one may give one's full attention to taking
evasive action. 75
This excellent logic leads one to think that
nonhumans too must feel pain,but Carruthers resists
the implication. He is plainly convinced that his
analysis of the difference between conscious and
nonconscious states has already shown that non
humans can feel nothing. Let us turn, finally, to that
analysis itself.

A problem with Carruthers' analysis of the
conscious/unconscious distinction
The problem can be stated very briefly. Carruthers
gives no convincing defense of his analysis of the
distinction between conscious and unconscious
"experiences." He defends his Dennett-based view that
any conscious experience can be consciously thought
about, but he does not defend his additional claim that
one must be able to think about that thought in turn in
order to have a conscious experience. Why should one
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4Bernard Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Conscious
ness,Animal Pain and Science (Oxford: Oxford U. Press,
1989), p. 154.

have to be able to mull over one's thoughts about one's
experiences in order to have the experience-to feel
something-in the first place? Quite a few humans
would be automata on this viewe6 If one employs
Occam's razor to lop off the extra layer on Carruthers'
analysis, dropping the requirement that one be able to
think about one's thought about one's experience, it is
no longer implausible to imagine that nonhumans<and
many humans) can "think things consciously to
themselves." As Johnson very rightly points out, one
would think this implausible only if one requires
thoughts to be expressible in a language, and Carruthers
himself denies that such a requirement is necessary.77
Why shouldn't the cat be aware that she is afraid during
a thunderstorm and take deliberate steps to feel safer?
Carruthers' account is far less plausible than the
hypothesis that this is exactly what is happening.
Thus, neither Harrison nor Carruthers has succeeded
in resurrecting the Cartesian machine-model of
nonhuman animals. On their views, actual nonhuman
animal behaviorrequires a cosmic puppeteer; otherwise,
it is a bottomless mystery. The real mystery here is how
clever, sophisticated philosophers can lead themselves
so thoroughly astray. The ad hominem fallacy is indeed
to be avoided, but one cannot help wondering if
Descartes and his modem counterparts would have
argued as they did, had they not had such powerful
incentives to deny nonhuman suffering as a devotion
to vivisection, factory farming, or theodicy, and a
common vision of human superiority.

5Ibid., p. 154.
6 James Rachels, CreatedjromAnimals (Oxford: Oxford
U.Press, 1990).

7

SPeter Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," Philosophy
64 (247), January 1989, pp. 79-92.
9 Peter Carruthers, "Brute Experience," The Journal of
Philosophy 86,1989, pp. 258-269.

. 10 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, Second Edition (New
York: Random House 1990), pp.201-2.
11 James Rachels, op. cit., p. 129. Anunals subjected to
procedures without anesthesia or analgesia still sometimes
have their vocal cords tied. See Singer, op. cit., p. 29.

12 "The Growth of Anti-Vivisection," The Animals'
Agenda, September/October 1988, p. 50.
13 Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Athens,
Ga.: The U. of Georgia Press, 1983), p. 28.

14Bernard Rollin, "The Moral Status of Research Animals
in Psychology," The American Psychologist, August 1985,
920-926, p. 924.
15 The implications both men's views have for very young
and very mentally handicapped humans are perhaps less
attractive, as we shall see.
16 It is retitled "Animal Pain" in Robert Baird and Stuart
Rosenbaum, eds., Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues
(Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Press, 1991), pp. 128-139.

Notes
I The objection that the argument is weak because one is
reasoning from only one case-one's own-confuses
analogical with enwnerative inductive reasoning. Since one
type of analogical reasoning does indeed call for enumeration
of several cases in its premises, it is easy to see how the
confusion arises. (For the two types of analogical inference,
see, e.g., Howard Kahane, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric,
Fifth Edition, (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,
1988), p. 304.

17 Harrison, "Theodicy and Animal Pain," p. 92.
IS Carruthers, op. cit., p. 268. He allows us to indulge in
the belief that animals are conscious only when this belief
has no "morally significant" effect on other humans (269).
Depriving someone of a factory-farmed Chicken McNugget
appears to count as morally significant.
19 Edward Johnson, "Carruthers on Consciousness and
Moral Status," Between the Species 7 (4), Fall 1991,
pp.190-92.

2 Letter by Des~artes to Henry Moore, reprinted in Animal
Rights and Human Obligations, Second Edition, Tom Regan
and Peter Singer, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1989), p. 18. The belief that other hwnan minds exist, by
contrast, is apparently "clear and distinct" enough to be
warranted in Descartes' terms.

20 Harrison, op. cit., p. 79. Human suffering is not
explained away in these terms either, in my view, but that is a
topic for another paper.

21 Ibid. p. 81. He does not take note of the fact that the
same problem arises, notoriously, for the assumption that other

3 For

a detailed critique of Descartes' claims about non
human animals, see Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights
(Berkeley, Cal.: U. of California Press, 1983), Chapter One.
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Animal Consciousness (Buffalo, N. Y.: Prometheus Books,
1989). See also Bernard Rollin, The Unheeded Cry, op. cit.,
and James Rachels, Ever Since Darwin, op. cit. For an
excellent review of the ethological evidence and its ethical
implications, see Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson,
"Reflective Ethology, Applied Philosophy, and the Moral
Status of Animals," Chapter One of Perspectives in
Ethology, v. 9, P.P.G. Bateson and P.H. Klopfer, eds. (New
York: Plenum Publishing, 1991).

humans can have pain experiences. If he were asked about this,
he might follow Descartes in adopting a language criterion of
consciousness. Although we are not the only animals who
scream, he might say. we are the only ones who scream "God,
that hurts!" There are many well-known difficulties with the
language criterion (see Rollin, The Unheeded Cry, Chapter Six),
but there is an extra difficulty for Harrison, should he try to use
it: he concedes that some nonhumans are capable of learning a
language (footnote 8, p. 82).
22 Ibid,

p. 82.

34 Harrison,

23 Stephen Jay Gould, "Evolution as Fact and Theory,"
Discover, May 1981,34-37: 36. For more discussion, see his
"Darwinism Defined" in the same science magazine (January
1987, pp. 64-70), and his book Ever Since Darwin: Reflections
in Natural History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

37 Bernard
38

24 Niles

Eldridge, The Monkey Business: A Scientist Looks
at Creationism (New York: Pocket Books, 1982), p. 115.
25 Stephen

Rollin, The Unheeded Cry, op. cit., pp. 145-6.

Harrison, op. cit., p. 85.

39 Richard Restak, M.D., The Brain (New York: Bantam
Books, 1984), pp. 156, 162.

Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin, op. cit., p. 11.

40 Note that this phenomenon, if it could be shown to hold
for nonhumans suffering violent attack, would not by itself
license moral agents to treat them in these ways, any more
than we would be licensed to do the same to humans.
Individuals undergoing great physical trauma are gravely
damaged, even if they might possibly not be suffering at that
moment. If it were nevertheless permissible, which I doubt,
to attack a nonhuman but not a human, it must be for some
other reason.

Harrison does at least consider (then dismiss) the view
that a pain mechanism would have survival value for
nonhumans, as discussion of his premise 3 will indicate.
26

27 Peter Singer, op. cit., p. 122. I observed this first-hand
as an ethics discussant at the First International Conference
on Farm Animal Welfare, sponsored by the University of
Maryland's Departments ofAnimal and Poultry Science (held
at the Aspen Institute, the Eastern Shore of Maryland, June
7-10, 1991). Industry spokespersons and animal husbandry
faculty not particularly sympathetic to concerns about
nonhuman animal welfare had no problem admitting that farm
animals suffer from intense confinement; they disputed the
importance of this fact.

28

op. cit., p. 84.

41

Harrison, op. cit., p. 86.

42 Ibid. ,

p. 87.

43 He cites studies claiming, e.g., that opiates affect "the
psychological context" of the brain rather than the nerve
messages. We now know that opiates fill brain receptors,
preventing transmission of the pain impulse from entering
consciousness.

Harrison, op. cit., p. 82.

29 Allan C. Wilson, "The Molecular Basis of Evolution,"
Scientific American 253(4),1985, pp. 164-73.

44 Bernard

In a remarkable footnote, Harrison himself appears to
concede that nonhuman animals can be intelligent, creative,
and even learn genuine languages (footnote 8, p. 82). He
makes no discernible attempt to square this admission with
the claims made in the text of his paper.

Rollin, The Unheeded Cry, op. cit., p. 151.
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45

46 Ibid., p. 85. As we shall see, although he tries to make
sense of nonhumans' apparently learning from what we would
experience as pain, he makes no attempt to account for the
use of nonhumans in pain research. If he is right, one might
as well use daisies. (Sadly, a great deal of Ollf knowledge
about pain mechanisms comes from a tradition of research
on nonconsenting nonhumans. See Restak, op. cit.,
pp.157-161.)

Ibid., p. 84.

32 In this context, see Harrison's discussion of reflex
behavior on p. 84. I will address this discussion separately
below in the context of nonhuman animal learning.

33 Donald Griffin has written extensively on this topic.
See, e.g., his Animal Thinking (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
U. Press, 1984). See also Daisy and Michael Radnor's
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Anand and P. R. Hickey in the January 2, 1992 issue of The
New England Journal of Medicine. Some physicians were
also concerned about the dangers of anesthetizing such tiny
beings; the danger turns out to be in the opposite direction.

50 Ibid.
51 Few would claim that nonhumans, as far as we know,
are capable of conceptualizing moral principles and self
consciously choosing to act in accordance with those
principles. This does not mean that they cannot act virtuously,
however. See Steve Sapontzis, Morals, Reason, andAnimals,
op. cit., pp. 43-44, on this issue.
52 Harrison,

65 D. D. Edwards, "Study Supports Easing Circumcision
Pain," Science News 133, March 19, 1988, p. 182.
66 Langreth,

67 Peter Carruthers, "Brute Experience," The Journal of
Philosophy 86, 1989, pp. 258-269.

op. cit., Footnote 8.

53 That includes some theists. See, e.g., Andrew Unzey,
Christianity and the Rights ofAnimals (New York: Crossroad
Publishing Co., 1987); Steven Rosen, Food for the Spirit:
Vegetarianism and the World Religions (New York: Bala
Books, 1987); and Tom Regan, ed., Animal Sacrifices
(Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple U. Press, 1986).
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70 Carruthers,

op..cit., p. 88.

55 Descartes,
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p. 90.

58 Ibid., pp. 90-1. He appears to bejust as wrong about human
infants as he is about nonhumans, as will be discussed below.

59 Ibid.,

73

p. 90.

claims at one point that he is not denying that
nonhuman animals are capable of remembering past
experiences, since then they could not learn (p. 89). However,
the only example of nonhuman learning he gives is the
unconscious "learning" of a protozoan, as we have already
seen. Moreover, the ,thought experiments he gives us would
be utterly pointless without the claim, made explicitly, that
nonhuman animals are akin to permanent amnesiacs. An
amnesiac, by definition, has lost her memory. [A permanent
amnesiac, he seems to think, would retain whatever has been
"learned" in the past, without realizing that she learned it
(p. 89). But this would only be the case for habitual actions,
the very kind of actions that no longer rely on ctJnscious
recollection. A painful experience the preVious day is quite
another matter. Amnesiacs, in fact, do not remember persons
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